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Determination of China’s Foreign Exchange 
Intervention: Evidence from the Yuan/Dollar 
Market 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – The paper investigates the determinants of China’s daily intervention in the 
foreign exchange market since the 2005 reform aimed at moving the RMB exchange rate 
regime towards greater flexibility. 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses bivariate probit models to test whether 
China’s intervention decision is driven by three sets of factors, comprising Model I (basic 
model), Model II and Model III. 
Findings – Evidence from the models suggests that medium-term Chinese interventions tend 
to be leaning-against-the-wind, while long-term interventions are leaning-with-the-wind. 
Furthermore, by analysing exchange rate volatility this paper finds that intervention is used 
by the Chinese central bank to ensure that there are no big swings in the RMB exchange rate. 
Originality/value – The paper will be of value to other researchers attempting to understand 
the policy of the central bank and, in particular, the factors that can lead to interventions 
during periods of financial crisis. 
Keywords – Foreign exchange intervention, Exchange rate policy, China 
Paper type – Research paper 
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1. Introduction 
Intervention in the foreign exchange market is an essential tool, widely used by central banks 
to direct domestic currencies to a desirable level or to stabilize the currencies’ movements 
(Sarno and Taylor, 2001). In recent years, while intervention operations have become much 
less common in advanced economies, research interest has shifted to interventions in the 
emerging markets, where this tool is now used extensively. According to a survey by 
Menkhoff (2013), official intervention in these economies takes various forms, and is an 
increasingly important force in international monetary relations. 
China is prominent among the emerging economies in making considerable use of 
intervention. However, despite great international concern and global repercussions, there is a 
surprising lack of studies of China’s foreign exchange intervention, including the factors that 
drive its intervention decision. The current research aspires to help fill this gap, and to 
achieve a better understanding of China’s exchange rate policy. 
 This research contributes to the literature by establishing key properties of China’s 
intervention, including the magnitude (in terms of time intensity), driving forces and policy 
behaviour. Central banks tend to operate foreign exchange intervention secretly, and this is 
especially so in China. In the Chinese context, the fact of intervention is obfuscated by policy 
jargon, in which it is described as ‘exchange rate management’. In this light, our first task is 
to estimate when and how often China has intervened, so that one can gauge the magnitude of 
China’s intervention measured in terms of time frequency. To do so, we search a wide range 
of media sources to identify the dates when China is reported to have intervened. Although 
media reports lack precision (Fischer, 2006), they are nevertheless valuable as a source for 
extracting information about China’s foreign exchange intervention, given the great opacity 
of those operations.   
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We construct a sample covering 8 years, from 22 July 2005 to 22 July 2013. During 
the period under examination, the Chinese exchange rate regime shifted twice. On 22 July 
2005, China issued an official statement announcing a shift from the dollar peg to a managed 
floating rate regime. However, this process was disrupted by the global financial crisis, and 
the RMB (Renminbi) reverted to the dollar peg around July 2008. In June 2010, as the crisis 
eased, the currency reverted to the managed floating system. This provides an opportunity to 
observe the evolving practice of Chinese interventions, including those during the global 
financial crisis period. 
We test the determinants of Chinese intervention using 3 determinant sets: Model I 
(basic model), Model II and Model III. The first set comprises the medium-term and long-
term exchange rate deviations from the trend, conditional volatility, and lags of intervention. 
The second set includes a proxy for national economic conditions and a dummy variable for 
exchange rate volatility. The third set includes interest rate differentials, deviations from the 
central parity, the foreign exchange liquidity index and foreign direct investment (FDI). In 
addition, in the bivariate probit estimation, we further classify the dependent variable of 
intervention decision into purchase and sale interventions. 
 We find evidence that medium-term deviations are an important factor in China’s 
intervention that adopts a leaning-against-the-wind strategy, but long-term deviations are in 
line with the leaning-with-the-wind hypothesis. We perform further analysis of the influence 
of exchange rate movements on the days when the RMB volatility exceeds its average level, 
and when the yuan is appreciating or depreciating. The results show that conditional volatility 
can trigger intervention. In addition, in purchase intervention decisions, the Chinese central 
bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), will consider a wide range of factors, such as 
national economic conditions, inventory imperatives, and FDI flows. However, in decisions 
on sale intervention, the PBOC’s main consideration is deviation from the central parity. We 
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find that interest rate differential is not a determinant of China’s intervention, as capital 
controls restrict free international movement of capital, thus preventing significant effects on 
the RMB exchange rate. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature.  
Section 3 introduces China’s exchange rate policy and estimates the timing and frequency of 
the country’s intervention. Section 4 describes the data and variables deployed in the study. 
Section 5 estimates the bivariate probit models. The results are reported in Section 6. Section 
7 presents the main findings of the study. 
 
2. Related Literature 
Central banks’ intervention is generally motivated by the intention to move the exchange rate 
to a desired level and to promote market stability (Baillie and Osterberg, 1997). Almekinders 
and Eijffinger (1994) suggest a finer classification of intervention objectives. In the short run, 
central banks commonly operate to ‘counter disorderly exchange market conditions’ (Dudler, 
1988). Then, in the medium term, they aim to combat large short-term exchange rate 
movements or ‘erratic fluctuations’. Their long-term objectives focus on resisting deviations 
from fundamentals, lessening the impacts of foreign shocks on domestic monetary conditions, 
and avoiding undesirable impacts of currency depreciation or appreciation. 
One of the chief concerns of empirical research in this field is to identify the main 
drivers behind government intervention. Jurgensen (1983) was among the first to study the 
link between long- and short-run exchange rate deviations and sterilized intervention. He 
found that only short-run exchange rate deviations affect sterilized intervention. Following 
publication of intervention data by the Japanese monetary authorities, Ito (2002) shows that 
deviations of the current exchange rate from its short-run (day t-1) and medium-run (previous 
21 days) trend rates would prompt intervention. In addition, deviations from the policy target 
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of 125 yen/US dollar can also trigger intervention.  In a further study, Ito and Yabu (2007) 
find that in addition to the influences of day t-1 deviation and the previous 21 days’ deviation, 
the past five-year moving average of deviations is also a triggering factor. However, Herrera 
and Ozbay (2005) and Beine et al. (2009) do not find this factor to be significant.  
Brandner and Grech (2005) study the influence of conditional volatility of exchange 
rates on intervention decisions for participant members of Europe’s Exchange Rate 
Mechanism I (ERM I). The conditional volatility is gained from a GARCH model. They find 
that the relation between intervention and conditional volatility differs across markets. 
Frenkel et al. (2004) find that volatility can affect the intervention decision. However, 
estimating a multinomial logit model and a nested logit model, Beine et al. (2009) find that 
the Japanese central bank does not take volatility into consideration when making decisions 
on intervention.  Galati et al. (2007) and Ito (2007) also obtain evidence that volatility is not a 
determinant of intervention. 
 Because of the nonlinearity in the intervention data, OLS estimates are inconsistent 
(Jun, 2008; Hall and Kim, 2009; Chen et al., 2012). In order to overcome this problem, 
researchers have applied the probit models in their intervention studies. Kim and Sheen (2002) 
develop a probit model to investigate the working of five determining factors behind 
Australian intervention: exchange rate trend deviations, conditional volatility, interest rate 
differentials, profitability, and inventory imperatives. Their results show that three of these 
five factors have significant effects on intervention; the exceptions are profitability and the 
inventory factor. Akinci et al. (2006) also apply the probit model to study the determinants of 
intervention in the Turkish economy. Similar to the Japanese results from Baillie and 
Osterberg (1997), they find evidence that, in the Turkish context, the main motivation of the 
official intervention is to reduce excessive volatility, and hence the leaning-against-the-wind 
hypothesis is not supported. Frenkel et al. (2004) estimate magnitude of central bank 
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intervention and test its determinants in an ordered probit model. Their results suggest that 
deviations from the target exchange rate level of 125 yen/US dollar is statistically significant 
for large foreign exchange intervention, but small-scale intervention is influenced by the 
deviation from the previous 25 days’ moving average. Ito and Yabu (2007) improve the 
specification of this class of ordered probit model by incorporating the political cost of 
intervention. They find that lags of the intervention variable are significant in the model, 
reflecting the lower political cost of continuous intervention. 
Among recent studies on intervention in emerging market economies, Loiseau-
Aslanidi (2011) considers the Georgian case by using squared changes in the exchange rate as 
a measurement of volatility, and finds that volatility can trigger intervention. Jackman (2012) 
tests the Barbadian foreign exchange market and gets evidence that greater interest rate 
spreads may reduce sale intervention probability, but do not trigger purchase intervention. 
Similar research has been conducted for other emerging or developing economies, including 
Turkey (Akinci et al., 2006; Herrera and Ozbay, 2005), Argentina (Brause, 2008) and 
Pakistan (Mehdi et al., 2012). Research focusing directly on Chinese intervention has started 
to emerge only recently. The main contributors to this sparse literature are Chinese 
economists in domestic forums, with an overwhelming focus on the consequences, rather 
than the triggering factors, of official intervention (Lu, 1999; He, 2007; Xie et al., 2008; 
Liang and Mo, 2013; Wang, 2013).  
 
3. Official Intervention in China and its Measurement 
3.1 Evolving RMB Exchange Rate Regime  
The reform to China’s currency regime in July 2005 ended a decade-long fixed exchange rate 
system. In a policy statement at that time, the Chinese central bank announced that the RMB 
would be managed ‘with reference to a basket of currencies’ instead of being pegged to the 
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US dollar. As a result, greater flexibility was phased into the new regime, and the exchange 
value of the RMB came under the influence of market supply and demand. The renminbi 
exchange rate could now fluctuate within a narrow margin around a base rate known as the 
central parity rate.  
 Under this managed floating rate regime, the RMB exchange rate was no longer 
determined solely by the US dollar, but also by the movements of a basket of international 
currencies. According to Zhou Xiaochuan (2005), Governor of the PBOC, the reference 
basket contained 11 currencies, with the US dollar, the euro, Japanese yen and Korean won as 
the first-tier heavy weights, while the second-tier currencies comprised the pound sterling, the 
Singapore dollar, Russian rouble, Malaysian ringgit, Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, and 
Thai baht. The weight of each currency was determined according to its importance in 
China’s external trade.  
However, when the global financial crisis hit, the dollar peg was unofficially 
reinstated. This unofficial re-pegging started in mid-2008 and lasted until June 19, 2010, 
when the Chinese central bank announced that it would ‘proceed further with reform of the 
RMB exchange rate regime and increase the RMB exchange rate flexibility’. Since then, the 
Chinese exchange rate regime has reverted to the managed floating rate system based on 
market supply and demand with reference to a basket of foreign currencies.  
Initially, the daily trading price of the RMB against the US dollar was allowed to 
fluctuate only within a narrow 0.3% band around the central parity. On 18 May 18 2007 this 
band was expanded to 0.5%, and then on 16 April 2012 it was expanded yet further, to 1%.  
On 15 March 2014, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) announced that, in 
the inter-bank foreign exchange market, the bid-ask spread of the daily trading price of the 
US dollar against the RMB would fluctuate by a maximum of 2% each way around the 
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central parity rate. Thus, over time, the RMB has gradually been allowed more room for 
fluctuation.  
 
3.2 Forms of Chinese Intervention  
The Chinese government has been reluctant to admit that intervention has ever occurred in 
China’s foreign exchange market, fearing that such an admission would fuel international 
pressures for the RMB to appreciate. However, from observation of China’s policy practice, 
it is possible to detect three major operations that the Chinese monetary authorities use to 
influence the foreign exchange market: 
(1)  The central bank intervenes by directly purchasing or selling foreign currencies in the 
marketplace. In the case of purchase intervention, the central bank buys foreign 
currencies with central bank notes; in sale intervention, it sells foreign money to withdraw 
the renminbi from the market. We term this type of intervention ‘CB intervention’, as it 
involves the central bank participating in market transactions.  
(2) The central bank controls the level and growth of the RMB exchange rate by specifying 
on each day a central parity rate within a permissible range in which the daily trading 
prices of the RMB are allowed to fluctuate in the marketplace. We call this ‘CP 
intervention’, since this intervention operation involves the setting and adjustment of the 
central parity.  
(3) Intervention may also take an oral form, including, for example, policy briefing, moral 
persuasion, formal and informal meetings, and telephone conversations. We call 
intervention through such channels oral intervention. Here, the Chinese central bank 
effectuates intervention by instructing or directing the attention of market participants 
towards ‘things to note’; it does so particularly with traders of state-owned banks, who 
are a dominant force in the Chinese foreign exchange market.   
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3.3 Measuring Intervention 
Of the three major forms of Chinese official intervention, the current study focuses on CB 
intervention, in which the central bank intervenes by directly purchasing or selling foreign 
currencies in the marketplace. To analyse the CB intervention, we first try to detect the time 
and time intensity of the Chinese operation. Following Beine et al. (2009), we search the 
global news reports that indicate possible PBOC intervention as evidenced in the statements 
of market traders and analysts. We scrutinize the newswire reports in Factiva and Reuters 
China that mention the PBOC, adopting two basic rules: First, when it is reported that direct 
central bank intervention has occurred, we mark this day as a CB intervention day. If the 
Chinese monetary authorities are reported to have purchased (sold) foreign currency (e.g. the 
USD), that day is designated as 1 (-1), and 0 otherwise. Second, when there is reporting of 
CB intervention via the state banks (indirect purchase or sale of foreign exchange), we also 
mark this as a CB intervention day and the sign of such intervention is marked the same as 
above (plus for purchase and minus for sale intervention). In determining the dates of 
Chinese intervention we take account of CB intervention information at various degrees of 
certainty, such as likely, clearly, covert, suspected, think, may have, and rumour. 
For the purpose of illustration, on 10/11/2012, news reports indicate that, believing 
the RMB exchange rate to have appreciated sufficiently, state banks including the Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China and the Agricultural Bank of China started to buy the USD, 
which pushed up the dollar price. Four traders in the market viewed this as reflecting official 
intervention. Therefore, we regard this day as an intervention day, and as the intervention is 
via purchase, it is marked as 1. In another instance, on 29/09/2011, because the USD 
increased sharply internationally, traders expected that depreciation of the RMB exchange 
rate would occur. However, the Chinese state banks instead acted to sell the dollar at the 
market closing time, which mitigated the RMB’s potential depreciation and so was 
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interpreted by market participants as an intervention. We therefore sign this date as -1, 
indicating sale intervention by the central bank. 
 Table 1 presents the total number of intervention days and their composition in terms 
of purchase or sale intervention during the period under examination. It shows that during the 
whole sample period, the central bank purchased or sold foreign exchange on 1176 trading 
days. Analysis of the composition of the intervention days reveals that the PBOC does not 
use intervention only to address RMB appreciation, since if that were the case the number of 
purchase interventions would be considerably greater than the number of sale interventions, 
whereas the actual numbers are 584 for purchase versus 592 for sale interventions. Rather, 
the PBOC seems to be motivated mainly by a desire to stabilize the exchange rate movements 
and offset abnormal exchange rate volatility.  
Figure 1 plots official intervention in the subsample periods. From the graph, one can 
observe that the number of purchase interventions is almost the same as that of sale 
interventions in the normal period (464 versus 462), but slightly less during the global 
financial crisis (120 versus 130). This difference indicates that during the crisis period the 
PBOC was more concerned about depreciation than appreciation.  
 
Table 1. Official Chinese Interventions, 22 July 2005 - 22 July 2013 
 Obs. Mean Std. dev. Skewness Excess 
Kurtosis 
Total intervention 1176 0.842 0.832 0.301 1.510 
Purchase intervention 584 0.560 0.898 0.981 1.962 
Sale intervention 592 0.284 0.451 0.960 1.921 
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Figure 1. Purchase and Sale Interventions in the Sample Period 
 
 
Note: The financial crisis period is defined as from 15 July 2008 to 23 June 2010; the rest of the sample 
time is the normal period. 
 
 
4. Data and Variables 
4.1 The Dataset 
To empirically examine the determinants of intervention in China, we employ a daily time 
series dataset covering 8 years, from 22 July 2005 to 22 July 2013, based on information 
from newswire reports provided in Factiva and Reuters China.  Excluding official holidays 
the whole sample period has a total of 2087 trading days. To further understand China’s 
intervention, we divide the whole sample into two sub-periods: the global crisis period 
from15 July 2008 to 23 June 2010; and the normal period, which covers the rest of the 
sample time. From Figure 2, it can be seen that movements of the RMB exchange rate were 
flat from 15 July 2008 to 23 June 2010, a period during which, in response to the global 
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financial crisis, China re-pegged its currency. We also use the supγ(F(γ)) test (Andrews, 
1993) to formally check the structural break dates and hence the crisis period. The results are 
broadly consistent with our selected period. We reject the null hypothesis of no regime breaks 
at the 5% significance level. 
Figure 2. Behaviour of the RMB/USD exchange rate 
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Figure 3. F tests for the regime breaks in the RMB exchange rate (2005-2013) 
 
 
4.2 Model I (Basic Model) 
Deviations from the trend level  
Following Chen et al. (2012), we include two trend (target) exchange rates to analyse the 
determinants of China’s intervention: the average of previous half year’s RMB/dollar 
exchange rate as the medium-term trend (target), and the previous year’s moving average rate 
as the long-term trend. Deviations from the trends are calculated as follows: 
Medium-term deviation: 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡 = 𝑠𝑡−1 −
1
150
∑ 𝑠𝑡−1−𝑖
150
𝑖=1                                         (1) 
Long-term deviation: 𝐿𝑁𝐸𝑉𝑡 = 𝑠𝑡−1 −
1
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𝑖=1                                               (2) 
It is reasonable to expect that a negative (positive) deviation, or appreciation 
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the case of RMB appreciation relative to the US dollar, the PBOC would lean against the 
wind to engage in a purchase intervention by purchasing US dollars. 
 
Conditional volatility 
According to Kim (1998), Akinci et al. (2006), Hou and Li (2015), and Sharma and Vipul 
(2015), GARCH (1,1) models with Student-t distribution are helpful to estimate the 
conditional volatility of daily exchange rate changes. In this study, a GARCH (1, 1) model is 
deployed to estimate conditional variance of the RMB exchange rate in the whole sample 
period: 
 
∆𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆𝑠𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑝,𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡           (3) 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐺𝐵𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐼𝑝,𝑠,𝑡−1                        (4) 
 
where ∆𝑠𝑡 is the log difference of the RMB/USD exchange rate. 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 is the Shibor rate, 
or the Shanghai inter-bank offer rate, which is used because of possible effects of the interest 
rate on the exchange rate. 𝐺𝐵𝑡 is the Chinese government bond yield, used as a proxy for risk 
measurement. 𝐼𝑝 and 𝐼𝑠 represent purchase and sale interventions, respectively. Appendix A 
reports the results from estimating the GARCH (1, 1) model. Given that one major objective 
of the PBOC is to stabilize the foreign exchange market, we expect that conditional volatility 
has a positive relation with intervention. 
 
Lag of intervention 
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Intervention is a sequential action. The central bank may intervene on different days and its 
effects may last into the next period. In addition, the lag of intervention could reflect the 
political cost (Ito and Yabu, 2007). We use a lagged intervention variable to study its 
dynamic effects on triggering subsequent intervention action. 
 
4.3 Model II 
Conditions of the national economy 
The national economy variable has a mutual relation with the exchange rate. Every year the 
Chinese government publishes the target GDP growth rate. In the process of reaching the 
growth target, the exchange rate is often used as a policy tool to influence external trade. To 
this end, government intervention plays a pivotal role in bringing the exchange rate to the 
level desirable for trade promotion. Given the availability of data at daily frequency, 
conditions of the national economy are proxied by the national stock price index.  
 
Dummy variables for exchange rate changes and size of volatility 
In order to study the different influence of exchange rate volatility in episodes of yuan 
appreciation or depreciation, we introduce two dummy variables: one for yuan appreciation, 
which takes the value of 1 when the yuan is appreciating and zero otherwise; the other for 
yuan depreciation, which takes the value of -1 when the yuan is depreciating and zero 
otherwise. We also use a third dummy variable, which takes the value of one when the 
conditional volatility is greater than the average level of volatility for the sample period and 
zero otherwise, to test the impact of size of volatility on China’s intervention decision. These 
dummy variables allow us to test whether high levels of volatility could lead to intervention. 
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4.4 Model III 
Interest differential 
Interest differential can be a proxy to indicate the possible degree of exchange rate 
overshooting (Kim and Sheen, 2002; Dimitriou and Simos, 2014). In this paper, the interest 
differential is calculated as the difference between the overnight Shibor rate and the US 
Federal Funds rate. If the interest rate differential increases (decreases), the RMB exchange 
rate will fluctuate upwards (downwards). The greater the exchange rate fluctuation, the 
higher is the possibility that the PBOC will step in to intervene. 
 
Deviations from the central parity 
In the sample period, China published the central parity rate on every business day from 22 
July 2005. The parity indicates the benchmark for RMB rate movements and is used by the 
authorities to anchor the RMB exchange rate system. If the RMB exchange rate exceeds or is 
below the central parity by too great a margin, the PBOC will intervene to address the 
undesirable situation. As such, deviations of the RMB exchange rate from the central parity 
can be considered as an indicator of the possible advent of official intervention.  
 
Liquidity index 
Liquidity of foreign reserves could be a factor that leads to intervention. In order to maintain 
the desired level of international reserves, central banks use intervention to adjust the reserve 
stocks. We use the ratio of foreign reserves to imports as an indicator of China’s international 
liquidity. Given the daily frequency needed for the empirical analysis in this research, 
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following Kim and Sheen (2002) we convert the monthly reserves and imports data to daily 
frequency through the spline function.  
 
Foreign direct investment  
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a major channel through which international capital moves 
in and out of China. It is also an extremely important driver behind China’s economic growth. 
Therefore, this variable has become a focus of policy attention in China, and its changes may 
trigger government intervention to influence international investments towards China.  
Therefore, we add the FDI variable to our models. To be consistent with other variables, we 
also convert the monthly FDI data to daily frequency. 
 
4.5 Data Statistics 
Table 2 below shows the summary statistics and stationarity tests for the variables. The 
results suggest that while variables such as deviations from previous 150-day and previous 
260-day exchange rates, conditional volatility, deviations from the central parity, and FDI are 
stationary processes, other variables such as the liquidity index, stock price index, interest 
differential and the RMB/USD exchange rate are non-stationary. However, these series may 
be stationary if taking into account the regime breaks during the sample period (broken-trend 
stationarity). 
18 
 
 
Table 2. Data Summary Statistics 
 Dev260 Dev150 Stock 
index 
Interest rate 
differentials 
Conditional 
Volatility 
Central 
Parity 
Reserves 
ratio 
FDI RMB/USD 
exchange 
rate 
Observations 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 
Mean -0.0112 -0.0031 55.8076 0.4303 -14.2758 -0.0037 20.087 9.8624 6.9879 
Median -0.0069 -0.0012 58.28 1.07 -13.9956 -0.0004 20.4718 5.7414 6.8287 
Maximum 0.0739 0.0556 104.18 13.69 -11.3667 0.06957 37.58 110.3277 8.109 
Minimum -0.1588 -0.1664 26.07 -3.93 -17.0827 -0.0674 12.2317 -36.6187 6.1214 
Standard 
deviation 
0.0198 0.0105 14.1108 2.5421 1.2744 0.1961 4.4964 22.1494 0.6224 
Skewness -1.5311 -2.3939 -0.0355 -0.0712 -0.5907 -1.1594 0.5414 1.4572 0.5283 
Kurtosis 9.6485 9.9252 3.2338 2.5415 2.5168 6.4435 3.7458 6.9504 1.941 
Stationarity 
test  
Stationary Stationary Mixed Mixed Stationary Stationary Mixed Stationary Mixed 
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5. Modelling China’s Official Intervention 
Rather than use an ad hoc method, we follow the approach of Almekinders and Eijffinger 
(1996) to derive formally the intervention reaction function. Specifically, the intervention 
reaction function is estimated by combining the exchange rate model with a loss function for 
the central bank. The exchange rate process is as follows: 
st = st−1 + ρIt + ω𝑍𝑡 + ut                                                                                     (5) 
where It is intervention, 𝑍𝑡 is the past information set, and ω is a row vector of coefficients. 
The central bank is assumed to have a loss function that should be minimized through 
intervention. The loss function to be estimated is: 
MinItE[Losst|Ωt−1] = E[(st − st
∗)2|Ωt−1]                                                                  (6) 
where Ωt−1 denotes the information available to the monetary authorities and market 
participants at the end of date t − 1. The specification means that the losses are defined by 
squared deviation of the actual exchange rate from the target rate at time t. 
Minimizing the loss function (6) by choosing It subject to the constraint (5) leads to 
the following intervention reaction function: 
I𝑡
∗ = −
1
𝜌
(𝑠𝑡−1 − 𝑠𝑡
∗ + ω𝑍𝑡)                                                                                     (7) 
We then generate a binary choice dependent variable to represent the probability of 
two types of intervention, i.e. purchase and sale intervention. One fundamental advantage of 
probit regression is that the dependent variable can be a dummy variable.  We use this 
modelling strategy to characterize the probability of official intervention occurring on a given 
day. In addition, this approach enables us to analyse a purchase or a sale intervention together. 
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We use the bivariate probit model as in Heckman (1978) to test the determinants of 
intervention: 
𝐼𝑝,𝑡
∗ = 𝛽1𝑥1𝑡 + 𝑢1𝑡                                                                                                    (8) 
𝐼𝑠,𝑡
∗ = 𝛽2𝑥2𝑡 + 𝑢2𝑡                                                                                                    (9) 
where 𝐼𝑝,𝑡
∗  and 𝐼𝑠,𝑡
∗  are latent variables. The actual intervention can be written as follows: 
{
𝐼𝑙,𝑡 = 2 𝑜𝑟 1  𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑙,𝑡
∗ > 0
𝐼𝑙,𝑡 = 0  𝑖𝑓  𝐼𝑙,𝑡
∗ ≤ 0
 ;  𝑙 = 𝑝, 𝑠                                                                   (10) 
where 𝑝 and 𝑠 are purchase and sale intervention, respectively, and 
 𝐼𝑙,𝑡
∗ = 𝛽𝑙,𝑡𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡,     with 
𝛽𝑙,𝑡𝑥𝑡 = α0 + αl,1LNDt + αl,2MEDt + αl,3CVt+αl,4Il,𝑡−1  
                +αl,5(CVt)(𝐷𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑡)(𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) + αl,6(CVt)(𝐷𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡)(𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡)  
                +αl,7SIt + αl,8IDt + αl,9CPt + αl,10RRt + αl,11FDIt                                               (11) 
where IntP,t is a  dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the type of intervention is 
purchase and zero otherwise; IntS,t is a dummy variable that takes the value of -1 when it is 
sale intervention and zero otherwise. LNDt and MEDt are deviations of the current exchange 
rate from the target exchange rate in the long term (moving average of  RMB exchange rates 
in the previous 260 days) and medium term (previous 150 days), respectively; CVt indicates 
conditional volatility of the RMB exchange rate; 𝐷𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑡 and 𝐷𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡 are dummy variables for 
yuan appreciation and depreciation, respectively; 𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 is a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 if the size of exchange rate volatility exceeds the average level, and zero otherwise;  
It−1 is the lag of the dependent variable. SIt is the MSCI China stock index, which we use as 
a proxy for conditions of the national economy; IDt represents interest differential between 
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the Shibor overnight rate and the US Federal Funds rate; CPt denotes deviations of the current 
market exchange rate from the central parity; RRt is the ratio of official holdings of foreign 
reserves to China’s imports; FDIt represents amount of foreign direct investment. 
The bivariate probit model is estimated with the maximum likelihood method and 
adjusted by heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix (Huber/White), which can help 
eliminate the effects of heteroskedasticity. 
 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1 Whole sample results 
Table 3 reports the results of estimation for the whole sample using the bivariate probit model. 
The estimation is focused on the determination of China’s purchase and sale interventions. 
We divide these determinants into three sets: Model I (basic model), Model II and Model III. 
The basic determinants model includes exchange rate deviations, conditional volatility and 
lag of intervention variables; Model II adds the volatility dummy variables and the national 
economic conditions index, while Model III is an integrated regression, including variables 
such as central parity deviations, inventory imperatives, and FDI. 
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Table 3. Bivariate Probit Estimation for Model I (Basic Model), Model II and Model III 
 
Model I Model II Model III 
 
Purchase Sale Purchase Sale Purchase Sale 
Constant (α0) 
-0.466** 
(0.213) 
-0.128 
(0.214) 
-0.838*** 
(0.133) 
-0.431*** 
(0.135) 
2.919** 
(1.348) 
-2.126 
(1.341) 
Long deviation (LNDt) 
1.778** 
(0.845) 
-3.478*** 
(0.805) 
1.321 
(0.874) 
-2.913*** 
(0.844) 
1.506 
(0.965) 
-4.436*** 
(0.932) 
Medium deviation (MEDt) 
-38.437* 
(20.273) 
71.082*** 
(19.210) 
-30.059 
(21.681) 
50.519** 
(20.954) 
-32.000 
(24.230) 
88.348*** 
(23.609) 
Volatility (CVt) 
0.042 
(0.062) 
0.225*** 
(0.063) 
    
Lag (Il,𝑡−1) 
0.102*** 
(0.030) 
0.285*** 
(0.059) 
0.113*** 
(0.031) 
0.297*** 
(0.061) 
0.106*** 
(0.031) 
0.266*** 
(0.061) 
Volatility (CVt)(𝐷𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑡)(𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡)  
 
0.172*** 
(0.034) 
-0.220*** 
(0.032) 
0.184*** 
(0.037) 
-0.209*** 
(0.034) 
Volatility (CVt)(𝐷𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡)(𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) 
  
-0.178*** 
(0.035) 
0.071* 
(0.038) 
-0.166*** 
(0.038) 
0.090** 
(0.042) 
Economy (SIt) 
  
0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.004* 
(0.003) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
Interest rate differentials (IDt) 
  
  0.011 
(0.015) 
-0.006 
(0.015) 
Central parity deviations (CPt) 
  
  1.705 
(1.685) 
-5.903*** 
(1.722) 
Inventory imperatives (RRt) 
  
  -1.698*** 
(0.629) 
-0.021 
(0.621) 
FDI flows (FDIt) 
  
  -0.200 
(0.123) 
0.377*** 
(0.125) 
log-likelihood -2198.550 
 
-2148.141  -2132.047  
Observations 2086 
 
2086  2086  
Notes: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. ***means the coefficient is significant at the 99% level; **means significant at 95%; *means significant at 
90%.
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Results from Model I  
For the basic determinants model, our analysis of the results begins by explaining the 
influences of exchange rate deviations. We find evidence that the long-term deviations have a 
positive and significant relation with purchase intervention, and are significantly negative for 
sale intervention, while coefficients on the long-term deviations α1 are positively and 
negatively significant for purchase and sale interventions, respectively. This outcome 
suggests that a current depreciation (appreciation) of the RMB exchange rate could induce a 
higher probability of purchase (sale) intervention by the PBOC, giving empirical evidence 
supportive of the leaning-with-the-wind hypothesis. In addition, the coefficient on the 
medium-term deviation α2 is negatively marginally significant for purchase intervention at 
the 10% level and positively significant for sale intervention at the 1% level, implying that 
medium-term appreciation (depreciation) of the RMB leads to a higher probability of 
purchase (sale) intervention. Therefore, the evidence suggests that in medium-term 
intervention decisions the PBOC applies leaning-against-the-wind interventions. 
The coefficient on conditional volatility α3 is positively significant, indicating that 
conditional volatility has a significant and positive influence on sale intervention in the whole 
sample period. That is, higher volatility of the exchange rate is associated with a higher 
probability of sale intervention. Given that a major policy objective of the PBOC is to 
stabilize the RMB exchange rate, it is conceivable that a higher degree of exchange rate 
conditional volatility boosts the probability of the PBOC increasing the supply of foreign 
exchange to the market, hence there is increased possibility of sale intervention. However, 
similar to the results from Kim and Sheen (2002), an increase in conditional volatility has no 
significant effect on triggering purchase intervention, presumably because withdrawal of 
liquidity from the foreign exchange market would serve only to intensify volatility of the 
exchange rate. As such, the signs for the variable of conditional volatility suggest that the 
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PBOC does not worry too much about market turbulence when the yuan is perceived to be 
strong. 
The lagged intervention shows a statistically significant positive impact for both 
purchase and sale interventions, since the coefficients on the lagged intervention α4 are 
positive and significant for purchase and sale interventions at the 1% level. This indicates that 
if a purchase (sale) intervention happened on the previous day, the likelihood of another 
purchase (sale) intervention occurring in the following days is high. 
 
Results from Model II 
In contrast to the results from the basic determinants model, in purchase intervention 
estimations the marginally significant effects of exchange rate deviations disappear. The 
reason seems to be that the Chinese monetary authorities use purchase intervention to control 
extreme volatility. Given that one of the main objectives of the PBOC is to stabilize exchange 
rate movements, it may choose to control exchange rate volatility by using purchase 
intervention. The negatively significant coefficient on long-term deviations α1 for sale 
interventions shows that appreciation (depreciation) of the RMB leads to China’s purchase 
(sale) intervention, supporting the leaning-with-the-wind hypothesis. On the other hand, the 
PBOC also uses lean-against-the-wind intervention in the medium term, since the medium-
term deviations are shown to have marginally significant impacts on sale intervention and no 
significant impact on purchase intervention. Furthermore, the coefficients on lagged 
intervention α4 are positively and statistically significant for both purchase and sale 
interventions. This suggests that intervention is a sequential process and the probability of 
intervention is higher when intervention has taken place on the previous day. 
On days when it is at a level higher than its average, conditional volatility has 
positively significant effects on purchase intervention when the RMB is appreciating, and for 
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sale intervention when the yuan is depreciating. The coefficients on volatility dummy 
variables α5 and α6 are significantly positive and negative for purchase intervention, while for 
sale intervention the signs of coefficients α5 and α6 are opposite to those for purchase 
intervention. This offers evidence that a further rise in volatility associated with an 
appreciation (depreciation) induces the purchase (sale) of US dollars, in line with the PBOC’s 
policy objective of not allowing big swings of the RMB/dollar rate. Compared with the 
results for the volatility variable in the basic determinants model, we find further evidence 
that there is higher probability that China’s monetary authorities will engage in purchase 
intervention on days when volatility is greater than the sample average and when the yuan 
appreciates, but not when volatility is of the normal magnitude. 
As can be seen from Table 3, the result for the coefficient on national economic 
conditions α7 shows that state of the national economy has a positive and significant effect on 
purchase intervention probability, and has a negative and significant effect on the probability 
of sale intervention over the whole sample period. When China’s economy is performing well 
(badly), the RMB/USD exchange rate tends to appreciate (depreciate). To promote growth 
through exporting (importing), purchase (sale) intervention is used as a tool to combat 
exchange rate appreciation (depreciation). 
 
Results from Model III 
Comparing the results from Model III with the estimates from Model II, we find similar 
outcomes for variables of exchange rate deviations, the volatility associated with appreciation 
or depreciation, the intervention lag and the national economy. 
In sale intervention estimations, the condition of the national economy has a 
significant influence. It is plausible that the national economy variable is associated with 
international reserves and FDI (Table 4). Polterovich and Popov (2003) and Lin (2011) show 
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that countries with growing foreign reserves exhibit higher rates of GDP growth. In addition, 
Alfaro et al. (2004) and Azman-Saini et al. (2010) obtain empirical evidence that FDI has a 
positive impact on growth. As such, the PBOC would take all these factors into account in 
purchase intervention decisions. 
 
Table 4. The Correlation between FDI, International Reserves and National Economy 
 
FDI International Reserves National Economy 
FDI 1 
  International Reserves 0.002 1 
 National Economy 0.177*** 0.227*** 1 
            Notes: ***indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 99% level; **means 
significant at the 95% level, and * means significant at the 90% level. 
 
The non-significance of the coefficient on interest differential α8 indicates that the 
interest spread between China and the US does not affect China’s intervention decision. The 
probable reason is that with capital controls in place, international capital movements in and 
out of China are restricted, hence relative changes of interest rates would not greatly 
influence the RMB’s exchange rate (Wang, 2007; Sun et al., 2009; Guan et al., 2012). As 
such, interest differential is not a significant driver for China’s intervention decision. 
Deviations from the central parity are significant only for sale intervention, with a 
negative sign.  In other words, when the market RMB exchange rate becomes greater than the 
central parity rate (depreciation), the likelihood of sale intervention is lower, meaning that the 
Chinese authorities would not proactively redress currency undervaluation. In order to get 
further details about the effects of central parity deviations, particularly the size effect, we 
additionally specify two dummy variables: 𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 and 𝑆𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 [1]. As indicated in Table 5, 
the purchase intervention decision is influenced by deviations from the central parity when 
they are greater than the average deviation level, and sale intervention is associated with 
central parity deviations that are below the average level. This implies that the Chinese 
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authorities would step in to intervene only when there is large scale depreciation or 
appreciation, which sheds further light on the behaviour of Chinese exchange rate policy.  
 
Table 5. Estimation of Effects of Central Parity Deviations 
 
Foreign Exchange Market Model 
 
Purchase Sale 
Constant (α0) 
2.100 
(1.348) 
-2.727** 
(1.360) 
Long deviation (LNDt) 
1.984** 
(0.942) 
-4.314*** 
(0.904) 
Medium deviation (MEDt) 
-49.734** 
(23.759) 
80.149*** 
(22.335) 
Lag (Il,𝑡−1) 
0.101*** 
(0.031) 
0.262*** 
(0.061) 
Volatility (CVt)(𝐷𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑡)(𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) 
0.192*** 
(0.037) 
-0.203*** 
(0.034) 
Volatility (CVt)(𝐷𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡)(𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) 
-0.158*** 
(0.038) 
0.090** 
(0.042) 
Economy (SIt) 
0.004* 
(0.003) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
Interest rate differentials (IDt) 
0.002 
(0.015) 
-0.014 
(0.015) 
Central parity deviations (CPt)( 𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) 
10.622*** 
(3.209) 
 
Central parity deviations (CPt)( 𝑆𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) 
 
-7.570***
(1.900) 
Inventory imperatives (RRt) 
-1.198*
(0.634) 
0.329 
(0.630) 
FDI flows (FDIt) 
-0.214* 
(0.123) 
0.373*** 
(0.125) 
log-likelihood -2126.145 
 Observations 2086  
Notes: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. ***means the coefficient is significant at 
the 99% level; **means significant at the 95% level, and * means significant at the 90% level. 
 
The liquidity constraint has a negative and statistically significant effect only on 
purchase intervention. That is, the greater the size of international reserves, the lower is the 
probability of purchase intervention. An increase in the international reserves implies an 
increase in the country’s macro-prudent position, hence relatively less need for the PBOC to 
take action to combat appreciation. 
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In contrast, FDI has a positively significant effect on sale intervention. The probable 
reason is that, while a reduction in FDI weakens China’s balance of payments position, this 
would reduce the PBOC’s impetus to sell dollars to push RMB appreciation. This would 
induce more foreign direct investment in China. 
 
6.2 Results from the financial crisis period 
Table 6 presents the results from the examination of China’s intervention policy in the 2007-8 
global financial crisis period with the bivariate probit model. The evidence indicates that 
during this sub-sample period, the main objective of the PBOC was to maintain confidence in 
the RMB. The RMB was re-pegged to the US dollar and China engaged extensively in sale 
interventions to combat RMB depreciation. On the surface this appears counterintuitive, since 
in a time of global crisis, a country may need devaluation to boost the economy. However, 
for China, it seems that the authorities regard confidence as more important, as the public 
would generally consider depreciation to be a sign of weak economic conditions. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that, for sale interventions, the coefficients on medium- 
and long-term exchange rate deviations are positively and negatively significant, respectively. 
This result suggests that if the market exchange rate deviates from its medium-term average, 
the PBOC will adopt a lean-against-the-wind policy, thus increasing the probability of sale 
intervention. However, when the RMB rate deviates from its long-term trend, there would be 
less impetus for the Chinese central bank to intervene, and hence the PBOC would lean with 
the wind.   
The national economy variable has a negative and significant effect on probability of 
sale intervention. This suggests that in times of financial crisis, in response to slower 
economic activity, it would be more likely that the PBOC would reduce sale intervention. 
This is in line with China’s pro-growth policy, since reduced sale intervention would offset 
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RMB appreciation and consequently may help promote external trade and growth. The 
liquidity constraint variable is negatively related with sale intervention, indicating that an 
increase in China’s holdings of foreign reserves would reduce the PBOC’s drive to sell more 
dollars, and hence would reduce appreciation of the RMB exchange rate.  
 
Table 6. Results for the Financial Crisis Period 
 
Foreign Exchange Market Model 
 
Purchase Sale 
Constant (α0) 
-2.631 
(3.732) 
6.529 
(4.221) 
Long deviation (LNDt) 
1.414 
(3.878) 
-7.303* 
(3.960) 
Medium deviation (MEDt) 
-49.194 
(123.052) 
245.774** 
(124.492) 
Lag (Il,𝑡−1) 
0.066 
(0.691) 
0.086 
(0.157) 
Volatility (CVt)(𝐷𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑡)(𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) 
0.099 
(0.152) 
-0.069 
(0.143) 
Volatility (CVt)(𝐷𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡)(𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡) 
-0.125 
(0.148) 
0.072 
(0.138) 
Economy (SIt) 
0.012 
(0.013) 
-0.036*** 
(0.013) 
Interest rate differentials (IDt) 
0.096 
(0.229) 
-0.338 
(0.256) 
Central parity deviations (CPt) 
22.699** 
(10.309) 
-30.679*** 
(10.328) 
Inventory imperatives (RRt) 
0.605 
(1.578) 
-4.399** 
(1.787) 
FDI flows (FDIt) 
0.020 
(0.290) 
0.505 
(0.339) 
log-likelihood -465.168 
 Observations 507 
 Notes: Figures in parentheses are Standard Errors. ***means the coefficient is significant at 
the 99% level; **means significant at the 95% level and * means significant at the 90% level. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper examines the forces that drive China’s intervention in the foreign exchange 
market through purchase and sale operations. Empirical evidence unearthed by this research 
suggests that exchange rate deviations, conditional volatility, lagged intervention, national 
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economic conditions, interest differential, deviations from the central parity, position of 
international liquidity and foreign direct investment have significant influence on China’s 
intervention decision. The PBOC conducts intervention in a leaning-against-the-wind fashion 
in the medium term, while leaning-with-the-wind intervention is deployed in the long term. 
The investigation findings show that China intervenes through the conduit of buying or 
selling foreign exchange to influence the exchange rate level as well as to constrain volatility 
so as to prevent big swings in the RMB exchange rate. It is interesting that deviation of the 
RMB from its central parity is a powerful driver for PBOC intervention, highlighting the 
pivotal role of this parity in China’s management of the exchange rate. In addition, we find 
that, in response to the global financial crisis, the PBOC prioritized maintaining confidence in 
the RMB and keeping its exchange rate stable. This sheds important light on the behaviour of 
China’s intervention in the face of great financial crisis.  
 
Note 
1. 𝑩𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒕is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the size of central parity 
deviations exceeds the average level, and zero otherwise. 𝑺𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒕 is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of unity if the size of central parity deviations is less than the average level, 
and zero otherwise. 
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Appendix 
Table A. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Garch (1,1) 
Mean Equation ∆𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆𝑠𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑝,𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
 Coefficient Std.Error 
Constant (𝛽0) 0.0001**   4.767e-005 
∆𝑠𝑡−1 (𝛽1) -0.140***   0.024 
∆𝑠𝑡−2 (𝛽2) 0.007    0.024 
Interest rate (𝛽3) -2.343e-005  1.955e-005 
Global bond (𝛽4) -7.839e-005*  3.019e-005 
Purchase intervention (𝛽5) -2.876e-005  4.861e-005 
Sale intervention (𝛽5) 1.423e-006  5.804e-005 
Variance Equation ℎ
𝑡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐺𝐵𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐼𝑝,𝑠,𝑡−1          
Constant (𝛼0) -0.358***     0.047      
Variance (𝛼1) 0.951***    0.003    
Error (𝛼2) 0.025***    0.001    
Interest rate (𝛼3) 0.002    0.003    
Global bond (𝛼4) 0.022**    0.005     
Purchase intervention (𝛼5) 0.004     0.011     
Sale Intervention (𝛼5) 0.007     0.012     
Skewness 4.48 
Kurtosis 39.041 
𝑄(20)  5.575 
𝑄2(20)  0.295 
Observation 2086 
Notes:  ***means the coefficient is significant at the 99% level; **means significant at the 95% 
level and * means significant at the 90% level.  
